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Abstract
Trading skills are highly rewarded in practice but largely ignored in
theoretical models of financial markets. This paper demonstrates the
importance of skills by exploring their interaction with market frag-
mentation and market stability. We consider a computational model
where traders’ abilities to accurately price assets are endogenous. In
contrast to models that do not consider skills, we find that centralising
markets can lead to poorer price discovery and less resilience to shocks
because it increases the equilibrium proportion of unskilled traders.
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1 Introduction
Trading skills command huge premia in the job market for professionals, par-
ticularly in the financial sector. Despite this, skills are mostly ignored in the
academic literature on asset markets. Bayesian rationality, the mainstay of
decision theory, simply disregards the possibility that some investors may not
have the ability to make good decisions: In the standard model all economic
agents are able to write down the correct equilibrium relations and solve the
resulting optimisation problem. In that world, information matters, but skills
do not. Empirical evidence, however, shows that markets are populated by
both skilled and unskilled traders, see, e.g., Oliven and Rietz (2004); Barras
et al. (2010); Fama and French (2010); Barber et al. (forthcoming).
This paper presents a computational equilibrium model of a market for
financial assets in which skills are endogenously determined. We define skill
as a trader’s ability to price previously unseen financial contracts correctly.
A skilled trader, therefore, follows an asset pricing theory that enables her
to make good decisions on the purchase or sale of incorrectly valued assets.
Although skill is irrelevant in perfectly efficient markets, it matters when a
trader has to post a price at which others can trade, e.g., in order-driven
markets, or when asset prices in a competitive market deviate from their fair
values.
Traders develop pricing skills through learning. We apply an evolutionary
learning process where natural selection ensures that only profitable trading
strategies survive. The approach is motivated by human decision-making
behaviour in ‘large worlds’, i.e., situations in which it is impossible to foresee
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all potential consequences of one’s actions. Binmore (2007) argues that in
large worlds Bayesian decision theory has to be replaced by other forms of
learning and decision-making. Some progress towards that end has been
made in game theory, notably by Ellison and Fudenberg (1993), where the
players apply decision rules learned in one set of games when playing a new
game in which they have no prior experience. This learning mechanism is a
key feature in the model considered here. It describes an adaptive market
in the sense of Lo (2004): The agents must either learn and become skilled
or free-ride on others’ skills, and their tendency to do the one or the other
depends upon the institutional setting and the behaviour of other traders.
The model is used to explore the equilibrium relationship between skills,
market fragmentation and market stability. We consider a market structure
with multiple trading venues. The market is centralised if there are few
venues and many traders at each venue, and fragmented if there are many
venues and few traders at each venue. We find that a move from a fragmented
to a centralised market structure can harm market stability and price dis-
covery by adversely affecting the proportion of skilled traders. Centralised
markets protect unskilled traders from the consequences of bad decisions by
allowing them to free-ride on the prices discovered by skilled traders. The
incentives to acquire skills are weak in more centralised markets, and, in
equilibrium, most traders are unskilled. This is in contrast to fragmented
markets where mistakes are exploited by skilled traders and therefore most
traders are skilled in equilibrium. As a result, fragmented markets are more
resilient and provide better price discovery. Inter-market price variation, de-
fined as the variation in prices between trading venues is, however, increasing
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in market fragmentation.
Regulators are concerned with the potential lack of competition amongst
exchanges; economies of scale and network externalities make these institu-
tions natural monopolies (Mendelson, 1987). Regulations such as MiFID in
Europe and Regulation ATS and RegNMS in the US aimed to increase com-
petition for order flow (Fink et al., 2006). As a consequence there has been
a rise in the number of alternative trading venues such as crossing networks
and dark pools which attract traders away from the main exchanges (Stoll,
2008). Despite the increase in the number of places to trade, the US market,
for instance, has been described by O’Hara and Ye (2011) as a ‘single virtual
market with multiple points of entry’.
Market centralisation during the last two decades has been accompanied
by a dramatic increase in the stock market participation of non-professional
investors (Bogan, 2008) who adopt investment strategies without fully un-
derstanding the risks (Bikhchandani et al., 1998). Our model shows that the
increase in the proportion of unskilled traders following market centralisation
is an equilibrium phenomenon.
Section 2 sets out a model of a market with multiple trading venues and
endogenous skills. Section 3 presents results on the relationship between
market fragmentation and the prevalence of skills, and its the consequences
for price volatility and market resilience. The section also illustrates the
effect of market centralisation under an inflow of unskilled bullish investors.
Section 4 concludes.
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2 Model
We consider a finite population of I traders who exchange option contracts
in trading venues of size N . Venue size is fixed within a market and ranges
from N = I where trade is centralised at one trading venue to N = 2 where
all trade is bilateral. Traders participate in a sequence of trading rounds.
In each round, traders are randomly assigned to trading venues. An option
contract is then randomly drawn from a continuum of possible contracts at
each venue, traded, and (imperfectly) hedged until maturity. After expiry, a
new trading round begins.
Market. The buyers and sellers of the contract at a venue are deter-
mined as follows. All traders simultaneously quote prices at which they are
indifferent between buying and selling one option contract. An equilibrium
price at each trading venue is then defined as the median of these quotes. At
this price supply is equal to demand. Traders with quotes above (below) the
market price buy (sell) one unit of the contract. Ties are resolved by ran-
domly assigning traders to be buyers and sellers. To avoid non-participation,
we take the venue size N to be an even number.
All contracts are European call options with a maturity of three months.
The price dynamic of the underlying asset follows a geometric Brownian
motion
dS(t) = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dW (t)
with drift µ and volatility σ. Traders also have access to a money market
with interest rate r. Time is measured in years and the parameter values for
drift, volatility and interest rate are given per annum. The initial spot price
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S(0) is fixed at 100 without loss of generality due to the scalability of the
price process.
An option contract is defined by a strike price K and the values of σ
and r. The drift µ is held constant across all contracts as it has a negligible
impact on the optimal hedge.
Gains and losses. At each issue date, a random option contract is drawn
according to Table 1; its price is established at each venue and traders ex-
change premiums. Traders then hedge their exposure to the option contract
until maturity by trading in the underlying asset and the money market.
At the beginning of each trading day, their portfolio is adjusted to match
the Black-Scholes delta-hedging strategy. At maturity, sellers pay the option
payoff (if any) to buyers.
The profit of a call option writer who delta-hedges the short position in
the 3-month option at times tn = n∆t with n = 0, 1, ..., 65 and ∆t = 1/264,
from the issue time t0 = 0 to the time of expiry T = t66 evolves as:
1
v(tn+1) = e
r∆t[v(tn)− φ(tn)S(tn)] + φ(tn)[S(tn+1)− S(tn)]
where
φ(tn) = Φ
(
log(S(tn)/K) + (r + σ
2/2)(T − tn)
σ
√
T − tn
)
and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, v(0) = 0.
1For simplicity we assume that the 66 trading days from issue to maturity, a quarter
of the annual 264 trading days, are equally distributed across time.
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With option price C, the seller’s payoff at maturity is
Π = CerT + v(T )− [S(T )−K]+ (1)
and that of the buyer is −Π because premium payments, hedge positions and
payments at maturity net to zero. Since the hedging strategy is not contin-
uous, it provides only an imperfect hedge. There is, therefore, a stochastic
element to the returns from all options.
Learning. Traders apply individual pricing functions to determine their
quote. A pricing function associates a real number to any combination of
values of the three option parameters: strike price, volatility and interest
rate. Contrary to standard asset pricing models, traders in our model do not
solve an explicitly formulated optimisation problem. Instead pricing skills
result from experience.
An evolutionary learning process is applied to model traders’ choice of
pricing functions. The pricing functions present in the trader population
evolve over time through (a) the imitation of successful pricing functions and
(b) innovation through random modifications of these functions. Success is
measured relative to the market rather than some artificial benchmark. A
trader’s pricing function is more successful than that of another trader if,
on average, it produces higher gains in wealth. The evolutionary learning
process therefore takes place on the level of the population rather than that
of the individual.
We represent the learning process by a genetic programming algorithm
with tournament selection as in Lensberg and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2007). Pricing
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functions are implemented as computer programmes. A programme is a
list of up to 256 instructions. Each instruction consists of an operator and
one or two operands. The set of operators is {+ , −, /, ×, max, min,
change sign, exp, log, Φ}, where Φ is defined above. Operands consist of the
three option parameters (strike, volatility and interest rate); 213 numerical
constants; and three temporary variables. Traders price options by executing
their programmes. Their quotes are given by the value of the first temporary
variable on completion of the programme.
To model market exit and entry, imitation and innovation, we use tour-
naments that are run after each option is traded and the payoffs calculated.
Initially each trader is assigned a random pricing function. A trader contin-
ues using a pricing function until he is replaced by a new trader according
to the following algorithm:
1. Tournament: Randomly (and uniformly) select four traders in the pop-
ulation and rank them by accumulated wealth.
2. Reproduction: Replace the programmes of the two with the lowest rank
by copies of those of the two with the highest rank.
3. Crossover: With probability χ1, swap two randomly selected sublists
of instructions of equal length between the two programmes.
4. Mutation: For each programme, with probability χ2, a single operation
or operand in a programme is randomly selected, and replaced by a
new random operation or operand.
All new traders enter the market with zero wealth. Accumulated wealth
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Table 1: Parameter values.
Number of traders I varies 2,000; 4,000; 8,000
Trading venue size N varies 2; 4; ...; 128; 250; 500; 1,000; 2,000
Stock price volatility σ uniformly drawn from [10%, 30%]
Interest rate r uniformly drawn from [1%, 6%]
Strike price K (spot price is 100) uniformly drawn from [80, 120]
Drift µ 6%
Discount rate τ 1% (per annum)
Tournaments per period 0.5% · I
Penalty if quote < 0 or > 40 5
Crossover probability χ1 0.50
Mutation probability χ2 0.95
is discounted. Each 3-month period, the positive (negative) wealth V of a
trader is reduced (increased) to (1− τ/4)V with τ the annual discount rate.
Discounting preserves wealth ratios and rankings in tournaments, but speeds
up the process by which poor traders with good pricing theories can overtake
wealthy traders with inferior ones.
Data set. Parameter values used in the numerical simulation are pre-
sented in Table 1. For each combination of venue size and population size,
we carry out 50 independent simulation runs. Runs differ with respect to the
composition of the initial population, the option contracts to be priced, the
assignment of traders to venues, and the evolution of pricing functions. The
pricing functions of the converged models are recorded and used to generate
data for the statistical analysis.
We use four different criteria to explore how the characteristics of the
option market change with the degree of centralisation. These measures are
based on a fixed, representative set C of 27 option contracts. This set is given
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by all combinations of the following parameter values:
σ = 0.15, 0.2, 0.25; r = 0.02, 0.035, 0.05; and K = 95, 100, 105. (2)
Traders’ pricing decisions on this set of options are evaluated only to collect
data; there is no corresponding change in their wealth.
The performance criteria are:
Skill as a measure of the proportion of traders who can correctly price
all contracts in the set C. A trader is said to be skilled if her quotes do not
deviate by more than 10% from the median of the quotes of all traders in the
population. Using the median price in defining skill ensures that all traders
are evaluated against the same benchmark.
Price volatility measures the time-series variability of consolidated option
prices. For each contract in C, it is the volatility of the time series consisting
of the median market price across all trading venues at each point in time.
Price volatility is the average of these volatilities across all contracts in C.
Price dispersion is a measure of the variability in option prices across
trading venues. For each contract in C and each point in time, the standard
deviation of the cross-section of market prices is calculated. Price dispersion
is the average of these standard deviations over time.
Price sensitivity is measured by exposing the market to shocks in terms
of entries into the market by traders with extreme option valuations. Let
P (0) be the median quote in the population without additional traders, and
let P (M) resp. P (−M) denote the median quote when M > 0 additional
individuals who post the highest resp. lowest feasible quote are added to the
10
market. For each value of M , we calculate the corresponding price sensitivity
P (M)− P (−M)
P (0)
/
M
I
(3)
and average over 50 independent observations and all 27 out-of-sample op-
tions in C. The shock size M can take values 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%,
and 80% of the population size I.
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the four performance measures.
With 33 different combinations of population and venue sizes2 and 50 in-
dependent runs, one has a maximum of 1,650 observations of skill, price
volatility and price dispersion. For price sensitivity, which is measured for
7 different shock sizes, we therefore have 11,550 observations. Except for
skill, these measures display a considerable amount of positive skewness in
the distributions of the dependent variables. In the regressions we therefore
use the log-transformed versions of those measures as the dependent variable.
We disregard the venue size N = 2,000, when I = 2,000, as price dispersion
is zero in this case.
Table 2: Summary statistics for dependent variables.
Statistic Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Skill 1,650 0.344 0.256 0.000 0.278 0.899
Price volatility 1,650 0.028 0.025 0.0004 0.022 0.199
Price dispersion 1,500 0.228 0.452 0.001 0.058 4.206
Price sensitivity 11,550 0.551 1.039 0.003 0.200 11.815
2The maximum venue size is 2,000 for all population sizes to ensure that these variables
are orthogonal.
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3 Results
The discussion of the results follows the list of performance measures: skill,
price volatility, price dispersion and price sensitivity. These measures capture
(a) the benefit of knowledge relative to the costless option of free-riding
on other traders’ ability to make good decisions, (b) time-series as well as
(c) cross-venue variation of option prices which would both be zero in a
frictionless market with only skilled traders, and (d) how well the market
responds to exogenous shocks to demand or supply.
The statistical analysis of the performance measures uses independent
variables drawn from the model: market centralisation measured as log(N)
(the natural logarithm), where N is the size of a venue, and population size
measured as I/1000. In addition, we define a dummy variable ‘Fragmented’
to distinguish between markets that are highly fragmented and those that are
not. The dummy variable is set to 1 for markets with venues of 250 traders
or less. At about this venue size the dependent variables exhibit a structural
break when plotted against venue size.
3.1 Skills
We first investigate how skill varies with the environment in which the traders
interact. The key variable controlling this environment is market centralisa-
tion, which we expect to have a negative impact on the proportion of skilled
traders. Three model specifications are used: Model (1) measures the over-
all impact of market centralisation on skill, model (2) considers whether the
effect of centralisation differs between markets that are more or less frag-
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mented at the outset, and model (3) looks at the effect of population size.
Table 3 provides the estimation results.
Table 3: Proportion of skilled traders. Data from 50 independent simulation runs for
each combination of venue size and population size listed in Table 1. The dummy variable
‘Fragmentation’ is set to 1 for markets with venues of 250 traders or less. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Skilled traders (percent)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 71.320∗∗∗ 13.303∗ 7.544
(0.939) (7.319) (7.281)
Centralisation −8.900∗∗∗ 0.235 0.235
(0.187) (1.067) (1.046)
Centralisation × Fragmented −12.453∗∗∗ −12.453∗∗∗
(1.104) (1.082)
Population size (1000’s) 1.234∗∗∗
(0.154)
Fragmented 66.452∗∗∗ 66.452∗∗∗
(7.393) (7.266)
Adjusted R2 0.574 0.630 0.644
Observations 1,650
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Market centralisation negatively affects the proportion of skilled traders:
The coefficient of the centralisation variable in model (1) is negative and
highly significant, and the model produces a good fit with R2 = 57.4%. The
smaller proportion of skilled traders in more centralised markets is directly
related to the possibility to free-ride. This possibility arises if (a) the mar-
ket price belongs to the convex hull of prices quoted by one or more skilled
traders, and (b) one can quote an extreme price without impacting the mar-
ket price. In this case the market price is fair and all traders exchange
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contracts at this fair price.
In centralised markets there are many traders at each venue; hence the
price impact of an individual quote is small. In bilateral trade, both traders
have a strong price impact as each quote contributes a half of the market
price. This scenario generates the highest number of skilled traders. Model
(1) confirms the hypothesis that the possibility to free-ride on others’ skills
provides an incentive for traders to not acquire skills. The more centralised
the market, the stronger is this incentive. In general, the higher price im-
pact of individual quotes in more fragmented markets puts more pressure
on traders to develop skills. For instance, in a population of size I = 8,000,
when trade is bilateral, 74% of the population is skilled, while this proportion
is only 19% under fully centralised trade.
Model (2) controls for the size of price impact of individual quotes by
adding a dummy variables that is 1 for venue sizes of 250 or less. The esti-
mation results show that the effect of increased venue size on skill is limited
to markets that are relatively fragmented. In highly centralised markets,
further centralisation does not decrease skill.
The effect of the population size is explored in model (3). In our data
set the smallest population consists of 2,000 traders. Model (3) shows that
greater population sizes have little effect on trading skills. Although this
variable (measured in thousands) has a statistically significant positive effect
on skills, it adds just over 1 percentage point to the explanatory power of
the regression.
As the skills of traders are most valuable in fragmented markets, skilled
traders prefer more fragmentation over less. The opposite is true for unskilled
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traders. In supporting large numbers of unskilled traders along with a few
skilled ones, the centralised exchanges in our model resemble those examined
by Oliven and Rietz (2004). Unskilled traders only have a small effect on the
price and receive very little feedback on their strategy; instead they free-ride
on the skills of others. Fragmented markets reduce the ability of individuals
to do this, forcing traders to develop pricing skills to avoid losing money.
Barber and Odean (2001) observe that with easier market access through
internet trading, there has been a growth in free on-line advice. Traders
can base their decisions on this information and, without requiring any skill,
free-ride.
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Figure 1: Histogram of traders’ price quotes under centralised trade N = I (grey line) and
bilateral trade N = 2 (black line). Trader population size I = 4,000. Histogram calculated
over 50 independent model simulations for each value of N .
The impact of market fragmentation on the distribution of quotes is il-
lustrated in Figure 1. It shows all quotes for one particular option contract
in the two extreme scenarios of bilateral and fully centralised trade. In both
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markets there is a large proportion of traders whose quotes are close to the
fair value of the option. In the fragmented market this proportion is consid-
erably higher due to the higher number of skilled traders. The centralised
market contains two large groups of unskilled traders who quote either very
high or very low prices for the option. These traders possess no proper the-
ory for the fair value of the option but choose to free-ride. As the number of
free-riders is an equilibrium outcome, unskilled and skilled traders are equally
well off at the option prices determined by the skilled traders’ quotes.
3.2 Volatility
Market fragmentation comes with the loss of a single, global price as each
venue can have a different, local price. This does not imply that the infor-
mational efficiency of fragmented markets is necessarily lower. An outsider
can use all of the information revealed in the process of trading to extract a
consolidated price, information that is, ex ante, not available. Suppose the
same option is traded at each venue, then the median of all traders’ quotes
can be calculated ex post. In a fully centralised market with venue size equal
to population size, the consolidated price is identical to the market price. In
fragmented markets it will usually be different. We therefore examine the
impact of market fragmentation on the time-series properties of consolidated
prices as well as the cross-sectional variation in realised prices. The model
setup is the same as for skills. Table 4 presents the results for time-series
volatility.
Model (1) reveals that the time-series volatility of the consolidated price
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Table 4: Price volatility. The regression is calculated using OLS and robust standard
errors. Standard deviations calculated from time series of length 10,000 for each of 50
independent runs for each combination of venue size and population size listed in Table 1.
The dummy variable ‘Fragmentation’ is set to 1 for markets with venues of 250 traders or
less. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Log(Price volatility)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant −5.873∗∗∗ −3.188∗∗∗ −2.910∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.390) (0.385)
Centralisation 0.426∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.057) (0.055)
Centralisation × Fragmented 0.579∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.057)
Population size (1000’s) −0.060∗∗∗
(0.007)
Fragmented −3.081∗∗∗ −3.081∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.385)
Adjusted R2 0.591 0.646 0.661
Observations 1,650
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
process increases with centralisation. A fragmented market therefore pro-
duces more reliable information on the fair value of the option. As illustrated
in Figure 1, a fragmented market displays a higher density of quotes around
the median price. The consolidated price is therefore less prone to change in
response to noise from unskilled traders’ decisions.
Higher volatility of consolidated prices in more centralised markets is di-
rectly related to the declining proportion of skilled traders due to centralisa-
tion. As skills react most strongly to centralisation when a market is already
fragmented, we would expect the same behaviour for price volatility. This
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hypothesis is supported by model (2). All of the effect of centralisation is
captured by the cross-term which controls for the ex ante size of venues. The
same mechanism governing the effect of centralisation on skill in fragmented
markets appears to drive its impact on time-series volatility. Population size
has only a small effect on volatility which is lower for larger populations.
This observation mirrors the small but positive effect of population size on
skills which is reported in Table 3, model (3).
From an economic perspective, centralisation of fragmented markets is
the main contributor to increased time-series volatility. The R2 of model
(2) at 64.6% is higher than in model (1) but only slightly lower than in
the full model (3). Our observation on the role of fragmentation on price
volatility is consistent with Smith et al. (1988)’s finding that markets with
a large proportion of unskilled or inexperienced traders have larger price
fluctuations.
Fragmented markets, while producing a consolidated price signal with
lower time-series volatility than centralised markets, generate many different
trade prices; possibly as many as there are venues. Since time-series variation
does not capture this effect, we also analyse the cross-sectional variation of
prices. Table 5 shows the results.
Cross-sectional price variation decreases with market centralisation, see
model (1). The explanatory power of the centralisation variable is high with
an R2 = 67.0%. Model (2) shows that the effect of centralisation on price
dispersion is not significantly different in markets that ex ante are more
fragmented or more centralised.
The uniform impact of centralisation on price dispersion is the result
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Table 5: Price dispersion. The regression is calculated using OLS and robust standard
errors. Standard deviations averaged over time series of length 10,000 for each of 50
independent runs for each combination of venue size and population size listed in Table 1.
The maximum venue size is set as 1,000 because price dispersion is zero if there is only
one market. The dummy variable ‘Fragmentation’ is set to 1 for markets with venues of
250 traders or less. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Log(Price dispersion)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant −0.425∗∗∗ 0.806 1.017
(0.051) (0.818) (0.833)
Centralisation −0.577∗∗∗ −0.726∗∗∗ −0.726∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.123) (0.125)
Centralisation × Fragmented 0.065 0.065
(0.124) (0.126)
Population size (1000’s) −0.045∗∗∗
(0.008)
Fragmented −1.031 −1.031
(0.820) (0.834)
Adjusted R2 0.670 0.686 0.692
Observations 1,500
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
of two different forces working in opposite directions because centralisation
impacts the proportion of skilled traders as well as the size of venues. In more
fragmented markets there are many venues but also many skilled traders.
This leads to a situation where prices at many venues are close to the fair
value. To see that this claim holds true, consider the differences in the
distribution of quotes in Figure 1. When the majority of traders at a venue
are skilled, or if there are enough skilled traders to make up the difference
between the number of unskilled buyers and unskilled sellers, the quote will
be close to the fair value. Hence many prices in a fragmented market will be
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fair. In more centralised markets there are few venues but many unskilled
traders. The law of large numbers implies that unskilled buyers and sellers at
each venue resemble closely their proportion in the whole population, where
their proportions are identical on average. In this case a small number of
skilled traders suffices to produce prices close to the fair value. The result in
model (2) shows that the two forces, the impact on the size of the venue and
the number of skilled traders, are about equal. Population size, included in
model (3), only has a minor impact on price dispersion.
We conclude that, from an economic point of view, further centralisa-
tion has the same positive effect on the cross-sectional price dispersion in
more fragmented as well as more centralised markets. Our results on time-
series and cross-sectional volatility mirror those in Madhavan (1995). Skilled
traders in our model effectively act as market makers; they set the market
price and are willing to take either side of the contract at this price. With
endogenous skills, fragmented markets do produce highly volatile prices at
each venue, however, the information revealed through trade is better than
in a centralised market.
3.3 Resilience
We measure the impact of centralisation on market resilience using price
sensitivity, see (3). This measure captures the response of the consolidated
price signal, i.e. the median of all traders’ quotes, to exogenous shocks which
are modelled as the market entry of traders with extreme valuations of the
option contract. Lower price sensitivity is associated with higher market
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resilience. Table 6 collects the results.
Table 6: Price sensitivity. Statistics for the regression are calculated for the 27 test options
on 50 independent runs for each combination of venue size and population size listed in
Table 1. The dummy variable ‘Fragmentation’ is set to 1 for markets with venues of 250
traders or less. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Log(Price sensitivity)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant −3.377∗∗∗ −1.259∗∗∗ −0.921∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.242) (0.238)
Centralisation 0.414∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.005) (0.035) (0.034)
Centralisation × Fragmented 0.451∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.035)
Population size (1000’s) −0.072∗∗∗
(0.004)
Fragmented −2.420∗∗∗ −2.420∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.239)
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.387 0.402
Observations 11,550
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Model (1) shows that price sensitivity increases with market centralisa-
tion. This is a direct effect of the loss of skill. Fragmented markets ab-
sorb shocks better than centralised markets because the higher proportion of
skilled traders leads to a larger number of quotes close to the consolidated
price. Model (2) provides separate estimates for fragmented markets. In this
model, the coefficient on the overall centralisation variable is still significantly
positive at the 5% level. This indicates that the effect of centralisation on
price sensitivity is not limited to markets that are relatively fragmented, in
contrast to the results obtained for skill and volatility. Population size has a
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small positive effect on market resilience, model (3).
The difference in resilience between fragmented and centralised markets
is illustrated in an example. We consider a scenario in which a market at-
tracts unskilled bullish traders over a prolonged period in time. The quotes
of these traders are always considerably above the maximum value of all
options considered and, therefore, will increase the median quote in the pop-
ulation. The effect will be stronger, the sparser the distribution of quotes
close to the median quote. We analyse two cases of different degrees of mar-
ket centralisation. In the first case, trade is bilateral, and in the second case,
trade is centralised at one venue. The initial trader population at time zero
in both cases is taken from the equilibrium of the bilateral market with 4,000
traders. During a period of length 5,000, each time-step sees the entrance
of one unskilled bullish trader with 50% probability. Afterwards the market
evolves without being subject to further exogenous shocks.
Figure 2 shows time series of the consolidated price of one representative
option, and the proportions of skilled traders, unskilled buyers and unskilled
sellers. Unskilled buyers (sellers) are traders whose quotes are at least 10%
above (below) the market price for all options. Panel (a) shows that in the
bilateral market an exogenous inflow of bullish traders increases the average
price to levels well above the fair value. As soon as the inflow of new buyers
stops, both the price and the number of unskilled buyers fall back to their
original levels and the market returns to its equilibrium.
Panel (b) in Figure 2 depicts the scenario in which the inflow of bullish
traders coincides with a change in market structure from bilateral to cen-
tralised trade. The inflow leads to a period during which the option is over-
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(b) Centralised market
Figure 2: Market price and frequency of trader types in a bilateral market (Panel (a))
and in a centralised market (Panel (b)). Initial population of 4,000 traders taken from
a market with bilateral trade. Arrival of bullish traders with constant quote equal to
40 during the first 5,000 periods (in each period, with probability 0.5, one such trader
is added). Time in units of 1,000. Left-hand panels: time series of median quote of one
option market (black) and the option’s fair value (grey). Right-hand panels: percentage of
skilled traders, unskilled buyers (including those exogenously added) and unskilled sellers.
valued. The price rises by more than in the bilateral case because the decline
in the proportion of skilled traders is more pronounced. Unskilled sellers
outperform unskilled buyers and do at least as well as skilled traders (who
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are both on the same side of the market as unskilled sellers). Therefore the
proportion of unskilled sellers grows at the expense of skilled traders. As soon
as the demand from the new buyers is removed, the price sharply declines
and undershoots the fair value. Price volatility increases as skilled traders
are replaced by unskilled ones. This is caused by the diminishing benefit
of possessing skills in more centralised markets. To put the negative effect
into perspective, we note that initially 76% of the traders are skilled but,
by period 30,000 (not shown in figure), their proportion is reduced to 28%
and asymptotically becomes 5.6%. In contrast, the proportion of unskilled
buyers and sellers increases from 12.6% to 62.4%.
4 Conclusion
The paper demonstrates that the ability of traders to make good decisions,
rather than taken for granted, can be considered as an equilibrium phe-
nomenon. To this end, we propose a model where skills are endogenous. We
study the effect of market centralisation on the prevalence of traders with
skills. We find that centralised markets generate the lowest proportion of
skilled traders while bilateral trade generates the highest. This has impli-
cations for market resilience and price discovery. Both are highest when all
trade is bilateral and lowest in centralised markets. These benefits, however,
come at the cost of higher price dispersion across trading venues. Our re-
sults suggest that the cost efficiency and transparency of a centralised market
must be weighed against better price discovery and market resilience under
decentralised trade.
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By viewing skills as endogenous to markets, our findings highlight a hid-
den cost of moving the trade of complex assets towards centralised exchanges.
While it may be socially desirable to have an asset traded at one price, cen-
tralising trade to protect unskilled investors from the consequences of their
foolish behaviour can be counterproductive for market stability and price
efficiency.
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